Tens of thousands of minorities fearing persecution have fled Syria since its takeover by the Sunni Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham on Dec. 8, 2024.

While the group has promised to respect all ethnic and religious minorities under its rule, human rights advocates have urged caution. They cite the Islamic group’s poor history of respect for human rights in areas it has governed in recent years.

Syria’s population is predominantly Arab and Sunni Muslim, but minority communities have long been part of the region. Alawites, a Shiite sect and one of the largest minority groups, constitute about 10% to 13% of the population. The number of Christians, once another large minority group, has been dwindling since the start of the 2011 civil war. While accurate numbers are hard to come by, their population is believed to have shrunk to about 2.5% from 10%.

Druze, another religious group, constitute about 3%, while Kurds, an ethnic minority concentrated in the northeast, account for about 10% and are predominantly Sunni Muslim. Smaller groups such as Armenians, Circassians and Turkmen also contribute to Syria’s diverse mosaic.

As an expert on religious minorities, I believe that the future of these groups is central to discussions about Syria’s reconstruction. Their treatment will be a critical indicator of whether Syria can build an inclusive society, fostering trust among its diverse communities.

Syria’s complex minority landscape

The tensions surrounding Syria’s minorities are deeply rooted.

Sunni Muslims, the country’s most dominant faith group, have viewed groups such as the Alawites and Druze with suspicion for centuries. Though some Alawites consider themselves to be followers of Islam, other Muslim groups tend not to see them as part of the tradition, which exposes them to marginalization and persecution.

However, the rise of the Assad family, who are themselves Alawites, transformed the fortunes of Alawites. Under Hafez Assad – father of the ousted President Bashar Assad – who ruled Syria between 1971 and 2000, Alawites came to occupy key positions in the military and government. Concentrated primarily in Syria’s coastal regions such as Latakia and Tartus, Alawite communities viewed their alignment with the regime as a means of survival and advancement.

At the same time, the Assad regime prioritized gaining the support of other minorities in ruling a Sunni majority country. The Druze, historically marginalized in Syria due to their beliefs that combine elements of Islam with pre-Islamic beliefs, found a degree of protection under the Assad regime in return for Druze support.

The Assad regime also developed mutually beneficial relationships with the Christian minority. Christians were provided access to government positions and economic opportunities, particularly in urban economic hubs such as Damascus and Aleppo. They were given preferential treatment in securing business licenses and trade opportunities. In return, most refrained from supporting opposition movements, contributed to the regime’s public image and cooperated with the government.

Conversely, the Kurds, with their own language and culture, faced discrimination because of their ethnic identity. The Assad regime marginalized them due to its broader nationalistic policies aimed at consolidating Arab identity and suppressing other ethnic groups.

The regime systematically undermined the Kurdish identity through measures such as banning the Kurdish language, refusal to register Kurdish names, replacing Kurdish place names with Arabic ones, and banning Kurdish books and materials.

Shifting dynamics after the civil war

The civil war that erupted in 2011 drastically changed the dynamics of relationships with minorities.

Assad’s violent crackdown on opposition groups led to the displacement of more than 13 million Syrians, including over 6.8 million refugees, according to UNHCR, the U.N. refugee agency. The war resulted in almost a half-million deaths, about half of which were civilians, and a devastated economy and infrastructure.

Alawites, Christians and Druze, who had previously enjoyed relative protection under the Assad regime, faced increasingly difficult choices as the war intensified. The escalating violence left these groups with few alternatives for survival.

Islamist opposition groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and Nusra Front, an al-Qaida-affiliated jihadist group, threatened and persecuted Christians, Druze and Alawites, often viewing them as collaborators with the Assad regime. In August 2015, IS kidnapped more than 200 Christians in a village in central Syria. In July 2018, IS militants attacked the southwestern Druze city of Sweida and killed more than 200 people.

In response, hundreds of thousands of minorities, particularly Christians, fled Syria and sought refuge in Lebanon and other countries.

Without viable alternatives guaranteeing their safety, many minorities saw the Assad regime, despite its growing unpopularity, as their protector from sectarian violence.

Yet minorities in Syria were not uniformly united in their support for the Assad regime during the civil war. Although limited in number, some Christians and Druze joined opposition movements or advocated for neutrality. The opposition figures included Christian leaders such as George Sabra, a prominent member of the Syrian National Council, a key opposition group against Assad during the early years of the war.

In August 2023, Druze in Sweida organized protests against the Assad regime.

The situation for Syria’s Kurds has evolved significantly during the civil war. The Kurds seized the opportunity presented by the regime’s weakening control over large parts of Syria to establish self-rule in the northeastern region in 2012. They gained more legitimacy after playing a critical role in combating IS, with substantial support from the U.S. military.

Kurdish autonomy has provoked concerns, however, especially from Turkey, which is against the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish entity on its border. While the new leadership in Syria welcomed a partnership with the Kurds, it remains to be seen how the Kurdish demands for autonomy will be balanced with Turkey’s security concerns and Syria’s territorial integrity.

The fall of the Assad regime marks a turning point in Syria’s history. But, I believe, it also opens a chapter fraught with peril for the country’s minorities. The fate of these minorities will offer a glimpse into how inclusive the new Syria could become.

Ramazan Kılınç does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.