The seven U.S. states that make up the Colorado River basin are struggling to agree on how best to manage the river’s water as its supply dwindles due to climate change and a period of prolonged drought. Their negotiations, which are not open to the public, missed a Feb. 14, 2026, deadline the federal government had established, after which federal officials said they would impose their own plan.

The federal government has not yet done so, but the prospect of such an action is not good news for the nearly 40 million people who depend on the Colorado River for water, energy, agriculture and recreation, nor for the estimated US$1.4 trillion in economic activity the river supports.

We have led or participated in complex water management discussions from the river’s headwaters in Colorado to its delta in Mexico and elsewhere in the arid Southwest and around the world. Even on less contentious issues, the keys to success involve learning together, understanding one another’s interests, working through conflict and developing inclusive solutions for diverse participants. And that works best with an outside facilitator.

The five most common sources of conflict between people are values, data, relationships, interests and structure. The current Colorado River negotiations include all five. We believe a process designed and facilitated by negotiation experts could help break the logjam.

We recognize it can be very hard to reach an agreement when what’s at stake are countless lives, massive amounts of money, enormous quantities of hydroelectric power and not nearly enough water.

But compromise on Colorado River management is possible and, in fact, was achieved to curb California’s water use in the 2000s, to negotiate an interim agreement to coordinate operations at the Lake Mead and Lake Powell reservoirs in 2007, and to enact contingency plans to manage drought in 2019. But this time around, circumstances are different.

Previous negotiations

The negotiations leading up to those agreements were often facilitated by officials from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation who focused on reaching broad agreements on general principles and concepts before delving into details. Federal staff also actively guided key agreements and provided the science and computer models to make well-informed decisions. And the states’ negotiators knew the Department of Interior would act unilaterally to make damaging cuts to water supply if states couldn’t come to their own agreement.

The negotiators for the states had long-standing relationships and built trust by frequently communicating outside formal meetings and seeking to listen to and understand other states’ perspectives, even if they didn’t agree.

The states also agreed to use the bureau’s computer model for analyzing scenarios of climate change and management decisions. That meant all the negotiators were looking at the same data when delving into possible options. And the political and social environment was less polarized than today.

The current situation

In this round of negotiations, federal leadership has been lagging. The Department of the Interior has not made clear what the consequences might be for the states if they fail to agree. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation has been without a permanent commissioner since President Donald Trump retook office in January 2025.

And federal staff have only recently begun helping to facilitate the discussions.

The states are fractured into subgroups, according to whether they are in the river’s Upper Basin – Colorado, Wyoming, Utah and New Mexico – or the Lower Basin, which includes Arizona, Nevada and California. Each basin group holds strong positions and has generally been unwilling to shift.

Each basin group is using a different set of assumptions for the bureau’s computer model to explore options. And the discussion often gets stuck on details, which prevents progress toward broader agreements.

In addition, the political context has shifted significantly, with increased polarization and politicization of the issues, creating barriers to effective dialogue and deliberation. Today, compromise can seem unattainable.

But those relatively new challenges to Colorado River compromise are not an excuse for failure.

A way forward?

The current negotiations have all been done behind closed doors. From talking with people involved in the negotiations, we understand the negotiators have been left to set their own agendas and meeting plans and conduct their own communications and follow-up, with no formal facilitators.

It’s reasonable to expect the negotiators to be ready to represent their states’ interests, working through an incredibly complicated landscape of hydrology, climate and management scenario modeling, water law and administration, and politics. But we believe it’s unreasonable – and unrealistic and unfair – to expect them to also be experts at designing and facilitating an effective process for sorting out their differences.

Federal officials are not necessarily the best people to run the process either. And if the agency that ultimately needs to approve any deal is the one leading the process, real or perceived biases about the states or key issues in the agreement could further complicate the discussions.

We believe that agreement between the seven states is still possible. It may be less effective to bring in a third-party facilitator at this stage in the negotiation process, though, because of the degraded trust, hardened positions and shortage of time.

One possible outcome is that the Bureau of Reclamation will select and enforce one of the five management alternatives it outlined in January 2026. But that could lead to decades of litigation going up to the Supreme Court. No one wins in this scenario.

A more hopeful possibility is that the bureau adopts short-term rules that would give the states another chance to negotiate a longer-term deal – ideally with an unbiased third-party facilitator for support.

A collaborative and consensus-based planning process in the Yakima River Basin in Washington state in the early 2010s is evidence that while nobody gets everything they want in a negotiated agreement, “if they can (all) get something, that’s really the basis of the plan,” as a Washington state official told The New York Times.

Sharon B. Megdal is principal investigator on multiple grants and contracts, none of which funded or influenced the content of this essay. Megdal served as an elected member of the Central Arizona Project Board of Directors from 2009 through 2020.

Karen Schlatter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.